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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS-THE NINTH
CIRCUIT NARROWS THE NO-GROWTH-INDUCING-
IMPACTS EXCEPTION
JOHN CARSE*
N BARNES v. United States Department of Transportation, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) was required "to consider the environmental impact of
increased demand" that could result from the construction of
an additional runway at Oregon's Hillsboro International Air-
port (HIO).' Over Judge Ikuta's pointed criticism,' the majority
appropriately narrowed the scope of the precedents set forth in
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA' and Seattle Community
Council Federation v. FAA4 and required the FAA to take a "hard
look" at the environmental effects of increased demand in cases
involving "a major ground capacity expansion project. 5
HIO, Oregon's busiest airport in number of airport opera-
tions, serves all sectors of the air transportation industry: general
aviation, military, and a broad range of commercial air carriers
including those with nine or fewer passenger seats.6 Addition-
ally, HIO serves as a reliever airport for Portland International
Airport (PDX), relieving the congestion at PDX by "segregating
[general aviation] aircraft from commercial airlines and air
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A. 2004, University of Dallas. The author would like to thank his wife for her
patience, support, and love.
I Barnes v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011).
2 See id. at 1143-47 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
3 161 F.3d 569, 580 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the FAA need not "consider
the 'growth-inducing' impact" of an arrival enhancement project designed to al-
leviate existing problems).
4 961 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the FAA need not consider
the environmental effects of increased air traffic where the implementation of a
new flight path was designed to "accommodate the existing demand" and alleviate
existing delays).
5 Barnes, 655 F.3d at 1138-39.
6 Id. at 1127.
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cargo activities."7 In 2005, the need to plan for future aviation
demand prompted the Port of Portland (the Port) to develop
the HIO Master Plan, which, after exploring various alternative
actions, determined that adding a new runway for the exclusive
use by small general aviation aircraft would be "'the best means
available"' to address the airport's growing need.8 Because FAA
grant money would fund, in part, the construction of the addi-
tional runway, the FAA would be required to approve the modi-
fications and to prepare an environmental assessment (EA).'
Rather than prepare its own assessment, however, the FAA
adopted and published a Draft Environmental Assessment
(DEA) that had been prepared by the Port.' ° A component of
the approved draft included a forecast of future demand that
was incorporated from the demand forecast in HIO's Master
Plan, which the FAA included irrespective of the fact that a por-
tion of HIO's demand forecast "was outside the FAA's recom-
mended range of variation from its own forecast.""
After the Port's consideration of various options and determi-
nation that the construction of a new runway would not pose
any cumulative significant environmental impact, the FAA made
copies of the DEA available to the public, solicited public com-
ment for forty-five days, and held a two-hour meeting where
members of the public could speak and be heard.12 Following
the public meeting, the Port made some small changes to the
draft and prepared a final environmental assessment, which the
FAA approved, issuing a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) on January 8, 2010."
Following the FAA's approval of the EA and issuance of the
FONSI, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Ninth
Circuit pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110,14 arguing the FAA vio-
lated the National Environmental Policy Act of 196915 (NEPA),
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1127-28.
9 Id. at 1129.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1129 & n.7.
12 Id. at 1130.
13 Id.
14 The statute in relevant part provides that "a person disclosing a substantial
interest in an order issued by the Secretary of Transportation ... may apply for
review of the order by filing a petition for review... in the court of appeals of the
United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place
of business." 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2006).
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2006).
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with the Port intervening "as an interested party pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 46109."' 1 The petitioners raised five distinct claims,' v
four of which were dismissed as "not warranted,"'" "harmless er-
ror, '1 "unpersuasive, ' 20 or "waived ."2' The remaining claim,
which the Ninth Circuit deemed the petitioners' "main argu-
ment," asserted that "the FAA failed to consider the indirect ef-
fects of increased aircraft operations."2 2 The court, applying an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, 23 held in a 2-1 rul-
ing that, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) ,24 the FAA must con-
sider environmental impacts of any increased demand that
might result from the HIO expansion project. 25
In order to reach this ruling, the court first needed to deter-
mine whether the potential existed for increased demand result-
ing from the addition of a new runway at HIO and, if so,
whether the FAA and the Port (the agencies) had adequately
addressed such potential increase in their analyses.26 The court
found that while the agencies asserted that aviation activity at
HIO would "increase at the same rate regardless of whether a
new runway is built or not," and that while such an FAA determi-
nation is traditionally afforded significant deference, there were
no documents in the record that discussed "the impact of a
third runway on aviation demand at HIO. ' 2 7 The next determi-
nation the court needed to make was whether the agencies were
nonetheless permitted to omit a consideration of the effects of
increased demand since the project's primary purpose was to
alleviate existing demand, to which the majority responded that
the agencies were not afforded such a privilege in this particular
case, prompting Judge Ikuta's dissent.2"
16 Barnes, 655 F.3d at 1130-31.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1141.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1136.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1130, 1136.
23 Id. at 1132.
24 This regulation in relevant part defines indirect effects, which are effects
"caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but
are still reasonably foreseeable." Such indirect effects "may include growth induc-
ing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use
.... " 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2011) (emphasis added).
25 Barnes, 655 F.3d at 1139.
26 Id. at 1136-37.
27 Id. at 1136.
28 Id. at 1138.
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The Ninth Circuit began their analysis by first considering the
statutory background of the petitioners' claims, asserting that
the purpose of NEPA was "'to protect the environment by re-
quiring that federal agencies carefully weigh environmental con-
siderations and consider potential alternatives to the proposed
action before the government launches any major federal ac-
tion.'"29 While pointing out that "'NEPA imposes procedural
requirements designed to force agencies to take a "hard look" at
environmental consequences, ' ''13 the court conceded that
NEPA does not actually "contain substantive environmental
standards" or require "particular substantive environmental re-
suits. '31 One of these procedural requirements mandates that
federal agencies prepare an Environment Impact Statement
(EIS) before engaging in "'major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.' "32 In order to
determine if an EIS is required, the agency first prepares an en-
vironmental assessment; if the agency finds that the project will
not produce significant environmental impacts, it issues a
FONSI, but if it finds that the environment will be significantly
impacted, an EIS is mandated. The court pointed out that an
EIS is mandated where "'substantial questions are raised as to
whether a project ... may cause significant degradation of some
human environmental factor,"' 34 and "'an agency must use its
best efforts to find out all that it reasonably can.' ",31
The agencies, relying on the precedents established by the
Ninth Circuit in Seattle Community Council Federation and Morongo
Band of Mission Indians, argued that in the present case consider-
ation of the impact of increased demand was not mandated be-
cause the purpose of the project was to alleviate current
congestion and delay.36 In Seattle Community Council Federation,
the court held that despite an expected increase in air traffic,
remand to the FAA to determine the effects of such an increase
29 Id. at 1131 (quoting Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir.
2005)).
30 Id. (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
31 Id. (citing Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 524 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2008)).
32 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C)).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1136 (quoting Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 402
F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2005)).
35 Id. (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975)).
36 Id. at 1138.
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was unnecessary because the project "'deal[t] with the existing
air traffic" and its "purpose was 'not to facilitate that expansion,
but to ensure that safety and efficiency will be maintained."' 37
Similarly, in Morongo Band of Mission Indians, the court held that:
the FAA did not have to consider the impacts of an increase in
air traffic resulting from a new flight arrival path because "the
project was implemented in order to deal with existing problems;
the fact that it might also facilitate further growth is insufficient
to constitute a growth-inducing impact under 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.8(b).13 8
The court reasoned that the facts of the current case were sub-
stantially different from those at issue in Morongo Band of Mission
Indians and Seattle Community Council Federation because the
projects in those cases involved only changes to flight patterns
or a flight arrival path, whereas the changes at issue in the pre-
sent case "involve [d] a major ground capacity expansion pro-
ject."39 Citing the opinions of other circuits, the Ninth Circuit
found "that a new runway has a unique potential to spur de-
mand, which sets it apart from other airport improvements."40
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit appropriately narrowed the
scope of the precedents set by Morongo Band of Mission Indians
and Seattle Community Council Federation, providing that in
projects involving major ground capacity expansions, agencies
may not summarily omit a thorough investigation' of potential
growth-inducing effects. 41
In her dissent, Judge Ikuta disagreed with the majority's appli-
cation of the precedents set forth in Seattle Community Council
Federation and Morongo Band of Mission Indians, arguing that the
holdings in both cases established the rule that where the pro-
ject is designed to address existing problems, the authorities
need not consider any growth-inducing effects. 42 Ostensibly,
this would be the case irrespective of a project's scope-whether
it concerned the alteration of flight paths, the construction of
an additional runway, or perhaps something of even greater
scope. Additionally, Judge Ikuta cited the opinion in City of Car-
1 Id. (quoting Seattle Cmty. Council Fed'n v. FAA, 961 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir.
1992)).




41 Id. at 1139.
42 Id. at 1144-45 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
2012] 183
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
mel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Department of Transportation43 that where the
project's purpose is to address existing needs, consideration of
growth-inducing effects is not mandated.44 Finally, Judge Ikuta
argued that, her former arguments notwithstanding, the peti-
tioners' claim should be dismissed as having been waived be-
cause it was neither preserved in a way to alert the agency to the
petitioners' contention, nor was it "so obvious" as to be pre-
served on its own merits.45
An analysis of the majority's reasoning involves a two-part in-
quiry of distinct but related considerations, both of which must
be answered in the affirmative: (1) Was the majority's decision
within the scope of the court's legal authority; and (2) that be-
ing the case, did the majority, nonetheless, arrive at the appro-
priate legal conclusion? Because the court's reasoning was
based partly on statute and partly on case law, each will be con-
sidered in turn. Beginning with the statutory analysis, was the
majority's decision within the scope of the court's legal author-
ity? The answer to this inquiry is clearly yes. Pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, the court had authority to review
agency decisions under NEPA.46 Moreover, as NEPA provides
procedural, rather than substantive, requirements, the court's
imposition of a substantive-type standard on a procedural re-
quirement-namely, that a hard look should be given to the
growth-inducing impacts of major ground expansion projects-
would certainly not be preempted by the statute.47 But was the
majority's decision the appropriate legal conclusion? Again, yes.
By the statute's own language, one of its purposes is "to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-
ment ... and stimulate the health and welfare of man. 48
Squaring the majority's opinion with prior case law, the pre-
liminary question of whether the court's decision in Barnes was
43 123 F.3d 1142, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the construction of a free-
way in an already well-developed area would not provide sufficient opportunity
for additional development to merit closer consideration of the freeway's growth-
inducing effects).
44 Barnes, 655 F.3d at 1144 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 1145-46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2006).
47 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text; see generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321
et seq. (2006).
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2010) ("The NEPA pro-
cess is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on under-
standing of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore,
and enhance the environment.").
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within the scope of its legal authority is easily answered. Both
Morongo Band of Mission Indians and Seattle Community Council
Federation were Ninth Circuit opinions, and while the rulings in
each case may provide some precedential guidelines, the court
was and is free to diverge from and narrow the scope of their
previous holdings. Was the court's decision, nonetheless, the
appropriate legal conclusion? Again, the answer must be yes.
Unlike the facts in Morongo Band of Mission Indians and Seattle
Community Council Federation, which involved only modifications
to flight paths and flight plans,49 the modifications called for in
Barnes involved the full-scale construction of a brand new run-
way, which incidentally is a 50% increase from the number of
runways the airport currently has. 50 Rather than a divergence
from case law, as the dissent asserts,5' the majority refined the
law and narrowed the court's previous holdings to fit the partic-
ular facts in Barnes and arrive at a compromise that is both ap-
propriate and responsible. The holding in Barnes provides that
in some instances-for example, Morongo Band of Mission Indians
and Seattle Community Council Federation-further inquiry into
growth-inducing effects need not be warranted, while in
others-cases, like Barnes, involving major ground capacity ex-
pansions-further inquiries into potential growth-inducing ef-
fects cannot be summarily dismissed without an adequate
investigation.
While Judge Ikuta relied heavily on Morongo Band of Mission
Indians and Seattle Community Council Federation to support her
dissent, she would perhaps have had a stronger case had she
relied less on those and more on City of Carmel, a case she men-
tioned only briefly. In City of Carmel, the Ninth Circuit held that
construction of a freeway in an already well-developed area did
not mandate an inquiry into any growth-inducing effects since
any potential growth would be slight, if at all. 2 Like Barnes, the
construction in City of Carmel involved a major ground capacity
expansion project, as the highway was designed to alleviate cur-
rent automobile congestion. Unlike Barnes, however, the
court in City of Carmel did not mandate further inquiry into any
41 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
50 See Barnes, 655 F.3d at 1127-28.
51 Id. at 1143 (Ikuta,J., dissenting).
52 City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1997).
53 Id.
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growth-inducing effects. 54 Although this may have been a good
case for Judge Ikuta to emphasize more, it still would not have
carried the day. The cases are distinguishable. While City of Car-
mel deals with the construction of a freeway in an already well-
developed area, Barnes deals with the construction of an addi-
tional runway to accommodate increased airport activity. The
capability of an airport to accommodate an increased number of
aircraft with each additional runway cannot correlate directly
with the capability of a freeway to prompt development in an
area where the surrounding land is already well-developed. The
singularity of land use in the latter scenario would allow for the
renovation of preexisting development, but actual growth that
might occur by any new development is limited by the amount
of available, undeveloped land.
Would the Ninth Circuit rule the same today on City of Carmel-
by-the-Sea as they did in 1997, when the case was decided? Per-
haps yes, perhaps no. While these two cases are fully reconcila-
ble, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Barnes may prompt the court
in future cases to require a closer look at the growth-inducing
impacts that surround any major ground capacity expansion
project, not just with respect to airports.
By declining to extend the no growth-inducing effects prece-
dents set forth in Morongo Band of Mission Indians and Seattle
Community Council Federation to cover the construction of a new
airport runway, the court appropriately narrowed the scope of
these precedents and held that agencies must give a "hard look"
to major ground capacity expansion projects. While the prece-
dent established in Barnes will certainly be relevant to future air-
port expansion cases, the potential exists for application of the
Barnes holding to a wider context.
54 Id.
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